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Regional disparities present an ever present development 
challenge in most countries, especially those with large 
geographic areas under their jurisdiction. A neglect of 
these inequities may create the potential for disunity and, 
in extreme cases, for disintegration. In view of this, most 
countries actively pursue policies with a view to helping 
lagging regions catch up with faster growing regions. 
These policies have at best a mixed record of success. It 
is therefore useful to discern what type of policies work 
and why? In this context learning from the experience of 
the European Union (EU) may be particularly instructive 
as, over the years, it has provided significant support to 
assist poorer regions achieve convergence with the richer 
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regions. This paper reviews the impact of EU policies for 
regional development to draw lessons of interest to other 
countries pursuing similar goals. The paper concludes 
that policies that serve to create an internal common 
market by creating a level playing field that enables 
poorer regions to integrate with the broader national 
and global economies have the best potential to advance 
regional income convergence. In this context, removal 
of barriers to trade and factor mobility and providing 
enhanced access to information and technology to the 
lagging regions should be main policy priorities for 
regional development.  
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Reduction in regional disparities is a major concern for governments in most countries. Large 
regional inequalities represent serious threats to the economic and political stability of a country, 
and in extreme cases can lead to demands for drastic redistribution policies by the poorest 
regions (e.g., Bolivia), or even to calls for separation by richer regions hoping to avoid 
significant redistribution of their wealth (e.g., Basque country in Spain) or poorer regions hoping 
to do better in an alternative dispensation (e.g., Quebec, Scotland). While the poor may consider 
such inequalities as a manifestation of regional injustice, the richest may view a union with the 
poorest as holding them back in their drive to prosperity. Often regional economic disparities 
exacerbate existing ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious differences. As most large countries 
have these differences, it becomes imperative for the governments of these countries to manage, 
minimize and mitigate regional disparities. Therefore, it is not surprising that reduction in 
regional disparities has been a major policy objective of most governments, especially in 
developing countries, where these disparities are two to six times more than in the developed 
countries (Shankar and Shah, 2003, 2008). 
 
Several countries have tried different regional development approaches with a mixed record of 
success. These regional development approaches have involved addressing two broad questions. 
First, should regional policy be interventionist in nature using the various economic tools at the 
hands of a developmental state or should it concentrate on creating a free common market 
removing internal barriers to trade and movement of people? Second, should regional 
development follow a paternalistic approach where a strong center decides and implements what 
is in the best interest for regions or should the center take a hands-off approach and let 
decentralized regional governments take the lead for their own economic development?  
 
To address both these questions, we have to look at both theory and empirical evidence. There is 
a substantial theoretical literature that weighs in on the first question and slightly less abundant 
one addressing the latter. There is also a diverse literature that provides us with an empirical 
view on these questions directly or indirectly in several different countries of the world. One 
particular region of the world, where there has been a great deal of interest in studying regional 3 
inequality and regional development policy has been the European Union (EU). As part of the 
economic and political integration process, the EU has put particular emphasis on regional 
inequality and devoted considerable resources to helping poorer regions catch up with richer 
ones, especially beginning in the late 1980s. The EU experience has been studied in detail by 
several different researchers over the past few decades. This has created a rich literature, and we 
do not intend to add to it an independent piece of analysis based on primary data. However, there 
is an opportunity for a holistic look at all the empirical evidence gathered and analyzed so far to 
draw out key insights that would address the two fundamental questions on regional inequality 
we have set out before. In this paper, we will attempt just that. We believe that this paper will not 
only add to the theoretical debate on regional inequality and regional development policy, but it 
will also help current and future policy makers as they grapple with regional development 
challenges both in the expanded EU and in many different countries of the world with large 
regional disparities. 
 
We also only focus on studies that looked at the EU-15, as we believe that the literature on this 
group is more established. The enlargement from the EU-15 has been relatively recent and it will 
take some time for the effects to be seen and understood. In addition, there have been changes to 
EU regional development policies in the wake of the accession of the new countries, and this in 
itself could lead to different effects than past EU policies.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the conceptual 
framework and hypotheses and present an overview of the theoretical debate around the two 
questions of market vs. interventionist policies and centralized vs. decentralized decision-making 
on regional development. Following this, we briefly introduce the history, objectives, structure 
and key elements of the EU regional policy in section 3. In section 4, we survey the literature and 
present a summary of the overall trends on regional convergence/divergence within the EU. In 
section 5, we discuss and synthesize the key findings from the literature that has assessed the 
effect of EU regional policy on such convergence/divergence through the lens of the conceptual 
framework we set up in section 2 and interpret the findings to see which hypotheses they 
support. In the final section, we conclude with a summary of our results and point to future 
research opportunities. 4 
 
2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
In this section, we first present the theoretical underpinnings of the market vs. state intervention 
debate on reducing regional disparities. Followed by that, we discuss the theory addressing the 
second question on a centralized paternalistic vs. decentralized hands-off approach to regional 
development. Finally, we set up the framework and outline the hypotheses that we will test using 
the findings from the rich literature on EU experience. 
 
2.1 Reducing regional inequalities - free market vs. state intervention   
 
Boldrin and Canova (2001) present an excellent discussion on this issue. They frame the 
question a little differently and present the theories around convergence and divergence. Their 
convergence/divergence theories may be said to mirror the market/state intervention views on 
regional development. According to them, theoretically, strong convergence theory suggests that 
equality in factor productivity and income levels will be achieved regardless of initial conditions, 
provided diffusion and adoption of technological change is unrestrained.  This theory would 
support an extreme view of the free market hypothesis, which is that the state needs to do 
nothing and that market forces will lead to convergence as long as there is no barrier to the 
diffusion and adoption of technology. 
 
A weak convergence theory on the other hand requires competitive market structures to send the 
right signals for allocation of productive factors. Under the  weak convergence hypothesis, 
differences in technology alone do not explain the differences in factor productivity. Lack of 
competitive price signals such as those observed with regional incentives and subsidies, barriers 
to trade, institutional capability differences, etc. may perpetuate regional differences in factor 
productivity and income. As Boldrin and Canova (2001) put it,  
 
“The introduction of different capital goods or a different organization of production often 
accompanies adoption of new and more efficient production techniques. The presence of 5 
artificial barriers to relative price equalization reduces the incentives to adopt the most efficient 
technique, thereby preserving enclaves of low total factor productivity.” 
 
The implication of this view is that the state does have a role to play, but it is one of creating and 
preserving free market conditions. If it removes existing market distortions such as trade barriers 
and creates a level playing field for the regions, convergence will follow. This particular version 
of the free market theory is particularly apposite to the EU as one of the major objectives, if not 
the primary objective of the EU is to remove internal barriers to trade and factor mobility. To the 
extent that the EU is successful in this, one would expect to see convergence between regions in 
the EU. 
 
In both versions of the convergence or free market hypothesis which is based on the Solow 
(1956) neoclassical growth model, at the conceptual level regional convergence is assured under 
perfect competition, constant or diminishing returns with no external effects and free and cost-
less mobility of factors across relatively homogeneous  (with respect to resource endowment, 
topography, composition of population, human capital, political and legal environment, informal 
culture, etc.) regions within the nation state. This requires that political units are commensurate 
with reasonably large geographic areas with reasonably diverse endowments so that regional 
income differentials are attributable to policy and institutional considerations rather than simply 
to irreversible acts of nature. For example, one should not necessarily expect to have 
convergence among three completely heterogeneous regions comprising solely desert, 
mountainous and arable lands.  Several authors have found evidence in support of the 
convergence view. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) find evidence of convergence in US 
states and also in 73 regions of 7 European countries (excludes the cohesion countries of Ireland, 
Spain, Greece, Portugal). Mankiw et. al. (1992) finds evidence of convergence across countries. 
A considerable amount of work has been also done on regional and national convergence within 
the EU, but we will present the EU evidence in section 4. 
 
Strong divergence theory places a greater emphasis on path dependency (initial conditions 
matter), increasing returns to scale, and externalities of investment as sources of differences in 
factor productivity and growth (Krugman 1991, Romer 1990). Realization of increasing returns 6 
to scale and/or agglomeration economies under perfect mobility in one of the regions and not 
others would accentuate regional divergence. In fact, openness to trade may send the most 
productive factors to the advanced regions and a core-periphery divide is formed. Regions in the 
periphery then face divergence from regions in the core (Krugman and Venables 1995). Under 
strong divergence hypothesis, inequality in levels of income, technology and resource 
endowments will prevent convergence in regional growth rates. Under a weak divergence 
hypothesis, attainment of a minimum threshold of physical and knowledge capital in the regions 
is necessary for persistence and sustainability in economic growth. Thus some regions that attain 
the minimum thresholds in these factors may form “clubs” or “growth poles” and may grow 
faster than others and achieve “club convergence”.  
 
In both versions of the divergence hypothesis, regional convergence becomes more difficult to 
achieve under increasing returns to scale and with externalities of investment and growth. 
Reversing the resulting divergence calls for strong state intervention to promote economic 
development  in poorer regions and to help them break out of the vicious cycle of 
underdevelopment.  
 
2.2 Reducing regional inequalities – centralized vs. decentralized approach 
 
The second fundamental question on regional development is deciding the right balance between 
the role of the central and regional governments. On one end is the view that a strong center is 
essential to break the regional concentration of income. There are two strands to this view on the 
need for a strong center. First, poorer regions have access to fewer resources and thus to lower 
investment capacity. Therefore, there is a need for redistributive transfers from the richer to the 
poorer regions. As the richer regions would not do this of their own accord, and as the poorer 
regions cannot force the richer regions to do so, a strong central government is needed for such 
redistribution through central government transfers. These transfers are based on the same 
Harrod-Domar model that international aid to poorer countries has been based upon – poorer 
regions can grow faster by raising investment levels. Central transfers seek to bridge the gap 
between regional savings and the investment required for faster growth. Easterly (2001b) calls 
this the “financing-gap approach.” A similar but more limited concept in the public finance 7 
literature is that of fiscal balance, where transfers are used to reduce both vertical imbalances 
between the center and the regions and horizontal imbalances between the regions. These 
imbalances arise from a mismatch of spending needs and revenues that accrue to the regional 
governments. Poorer regions tend to have larger gaps between the revenues it can raise and the 
expenditures needed to provide public services. Therefore, it is argued that a strong center is 
needed to provide needed resources to the poorer regions. 
 
The second strand of argument in support of a strong center is that less developed regions have 
lower technological, institutional and administrative capacities. These regions just cannot cope 
with the challenges of development, and left to themselves, they will never catch up with the 
richer regions. This is parallel to the externalities and increasing returns theory of divergence in 
the absence of significant intervention. The difference is that the argument for a centralized 
government depends on the less developed institutional and administrative capacity of the 
government rather than that of the technological backwardness of the entire economy. In effect, 
the top down theory of regional development builds on the interventionist argument and says that 
as significant state intervention is needed for poorer regions to catch up, it becomes all the more 
important that this state intervention comes from a more capable center, equipped with better 
institutional and administrative resources. 
 
The opposite bottom-up view argues that decentralized regional governments accountable to 
their constituents best lead regional development. It makes this argument for four reasons. First, 
regional governments are accountable to the constituents of their regions (at least the democratic 
ones), and thus will follow policies that best serve their regions. On the other hand, a central 
government will follow policies in the overall national interest, and this may involve 
concentrating resources in a few regions with a view to more rapid economic development. In 
other words, in deciding between national growth and regional equity, they will choose national 
growth.  
 
The second reason in favor of the bottom-up view is that regional governments have access to 
better information about local needs, preferences and capabilities than a faraway center. This 
enables them to design better policies more suited to their regional context.  8 
 
Third, having a strong center redistributing resources to the poorer regions may create moral 
hazard. Regions may not want to develop and catch up as this would then take away the central 
transfers from other regions. The related argument here is also of dependency, especially if most 
of the transfers are in the form of income transfers. The dependency exhibits itself in multiple 
ways. One, it reduces the incentive to increase local productivity by creating and growing local 
enterprises. The incentive is lower for local individuals and businesses as central transfers 
provide them with income support. Two, central transfers lower the incentive of local 
governments  to raise local resources by enhancing local economic development. Three, it 
reduces the opportunities from wage arbitrage and makes it more expensive for external 
businesses to invest in the poorer regions.  
 
The fourth reason in favor of the decentralized governance approach is that centralized policies 
create reverse accountability especially if central transfers come with strings attached. Regional 
governments then adjust policy to win the grants, and this could be to the detriment of the 
regions. Further, this reverse accountability can lead to less oversight from the constituents on 
central transfers and hence, more opportunities for corruption and wastage. 
 
There is some empirical evidence from different countries that supports the bottom-up view. 
Easterly (2001b) shows that aid to poor countries has not resulted in higher growth. Shankar and 
Shah (2003) find that more decentralized countries at similar development levels tend to have 
lower inequalities. Chen and Fleisher (1996) point out that reduced central government control 
over existing enterprises in China has given local government incentives to create better social 
and economic environment for local economies, led to better resource allocation, and thus 
contributed to regional equality. Kanbur and Zhang (2001) find that greater decentralization in 
China increases rural-urban polarization but reduces inland-coastal polarization. They say that 
the negative effect of decentralization on inland-coastal inequality goes against the argument that 
giving provinces greater power has necessarily had detrimental effects on all components of 
inequality.  
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Shankar and Shah (2007) also show that central aid to poor regions in India has not contributed 
to higher per capita regional GDP growth. In fact, in India, while central income transfers have 
gone to poorer regions, productive investments have gone to richer regions and increased the gap 
between regions. While the former creates a moral hazard problem leading to inefficient state 
government policies and dependency of poorer states on central transfers, the latter helps the 
states already ahead economically to increase their lead. This disproportionate flow of 
investments in productive capacity to richer regions has also been observed in other countries. 
Markusen (1994) states that regional policy in Japan, Brazil and Korea was only moderately 
successful in directing investment to smaller cities and underdeveloped regions. Even when they 
were successful, the smaller cities tended to be near the existing dominant ones. Although public 
investment has been more decentralized, private investment has continued to be concentrated. 
Even the building of communications and transport infrastructure has tended to reinforce the 
agglomeration economies of relatively developed  regions. Further, with world market 
integration, there is a greater tension between regional and industrial policy, and in the countries 
that Markusen studied, she found that the effect of industrial policy dominates.  
 
2.3 Framework and hypotheses 
 
Based on the above discussion, we can see four potential alternative approaches to regional 
development. Exhibit 1 shows these potential approaches, which mirror the four  alternative 
hypotheses we will test based on the EU experience. We lay these out below: 
 10 







• Strong central government
• Weak or absent regional 
governments




• Strong central government
• Weak or absent regional 
governments
• Minimize barriers to trade and 
factor mobility
• Provide level playing field
Regional drivers
• Limited central government
• Rule-based redistribution
• Expertise sharing
• Strong locally accountable 
regional governments
• Regional tax incentives, 
subsidies, protection, etc.
Regional enablers
• Limited central government
• Minimize barriers to trade 
and factor mobility
• Provide level playing field
• Locally accountable regional 
governments





o  Hypothesis 1 -  the “paternalistic driver” approach: According to this hypothesis, 
equitable regional development is best led by a strong central government following 
interventionist policies to assist poor regions to catch up with the rich regions. In this 
case, the regional governments are weak or absent. The central government actively 
redistributes resources from the richer to the poorer regions using different policy tools 
such as tax incentives, subsidies, transfers, investments, etc. 
o  Hypothesis 2 – the “paternalistic enabler” approach: In this case, the central government 
still plays the key role as in the first approach. However, its role is limited to creating and 
maintaining free market conditions. It removes barriers to trade and movement of people, 
and creates a level playing field between the different regions. Once this is in place, it is 
hypothesized that the natural process of convergence will lead to poorer regions catching 
up with the richer ones. 
o  Hypothesis 3 – the “regional drivers” approach: In this third alternative, it is the regional 
governments rather than the national governments that take the lead in regional 
development. The regional governments follow interventionist policies to encourage 
economic development in their regions. These could include tax breaks, subsidies, 
protection of local businesses, etc. The central government’s role is limited either to no 11 
redistribution or to rule based redistribution of resources. There is minimal central 
discretion involved in any interregional transfers. The central government can also 
provide institutional, administrative or policy expertise or facilitate the sharing of such 
expertise between regions. 
o  Hypothesis 4 – the “regional enablers” approach: This fourth alternative is similar to the 
third in that the regional governments still take the lead and the role of the center is 
limited. However, the role of the regional government is no longer interventionist, but 
limited to fostering a free market in the region, establishing the rule of law, protecting 
property rights and ensuring a level playing field. 
 
The EU experience provides the ideal testing ground for these hypotheses because regional 
policy in the EU displays in part all four approaches that we want to assess. It has pursued both 
market-oriented and interventionist regional development policies and regions across the EU 
have different degrees of regional autonomy to pursue regional policies. In terms of the former, 
the EU has created a vast common market and has consistently moved towards reducing internal 
barriers to trade and movement of people. On the other hand, it also spends a big share of its 
budget on redistributive regional policies designed to help poorer regions to catch up. As for the 
centralized versus decentralized question, the EU has a diverse set of regional structures from 
relatively autonomous regions in Germany and Spain to centralized institutional structures in 
England, Italy and Greece. There has been substantial research, as we shall show in this paper, 
on evaluating the impact of market/interventionist policies on convergence/divergence, and also 
on the drawing out the differences in economic performance in regions in different countries 
with different regional institutional structures. We analyze, re-interpret and synthesize the 
findings of the various studies and show that the preponderance of the evidence favors 
hypothesis X with some caveats. But first, we shall provide a brief description of EU regional 
policy in the next section.  
 
3 Brief history and structure of EU regional policy 
 
As described in a European Commission report (EC 2004a), the EU has been concerned with the 
reduction of regional disparities ever since its inception. The preamble of the 1957 Treaty of 12 
Rome mentions the need “to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their 
harmonious development by reducing the differences existing among the various regions and the 
backwardness of the less-favoured regions.” In 1958, the EU created two sector-based funds: the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF). The first explicit funds set up for regional redistribution was the 1975 European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) aimed at redistributing part of the Member States’ budget 
contributions to the poorest regions. However, significant changes leading to substantial 
allocations for regional development began in the late 1980s. In 1986, The Single European Act 
laid the basis for a genuine cohesion policy designed to offset the burden of the single market for 
the southern countries and other less-favored regions. For the 1989–1993 period, the European 
Council overhauled the operation of the Solidarity Funds (now referred to as the Structural 
Funds) and allocated ECU 68 billion (at 1997 prices) to these funds. In 1992, the Treaty of the 
European Union, which came into force in 1993, designated cohesion as one of the main 
objectives of the Union, alongside economic and monetary union and the single market. It also 
created the Cohesion Fund to support projects in the fields of the environment and transport in 
the poorer member countries. In 1993, the European Council allocated almost 200 billion ECU 
(at 1997 prices), one-third of the EU budget, to cohesion policy for the 1994-1999 period. In 
addition to the Structural Funds, a new Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) was 
also created. The next major change to the Structural Funds happened in 1999, when the 
European Council allocated over EUR 30 billion per year between 2000 and 2006, i.e. EUR 213 
billion over seven years. This is about 40% of the EU budget and 0.35% of EU GDP in annual 
terms (Ederven 2003). In 2000, the European Council adopted a strategy focused on employment 
and designed to make the Union “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world by the year 2010.”
1
                                                 
1 This short history is largely based on the account in EC (2004a). 
 
 
According to the regional policy design adopted in 1999, the European Council agreed upon 
‘Agenda 2000’, reforming a number of EU policies and re-establishing four “Structural Funds.” 
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1.  The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which finances primarily 
investment in infrastructure and employment, but also initiatives of small-scale 
businesses.  
2.  The European Social Fund (ESF), which supports programs that aid the integration of the 
unemployed or otherwise disadvantaged groups in the labor market.  
3.  The Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF), which supports farmers and finances programs for the development of rural 
areas. 
4.  The Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), which aims to restructure and 
modernize the fishing fleet. 
 
The bulk the four Structural Funds is allocated according to three ‘Objectives’ as described 
below (EC 2004a, Ederveen et. al. 2003, Boldrin and Canova 2001): 
 
•  Objective 1 is to help lagging regions catch up with the rest of Europe by providing basic 
infrastructure and encouraging business activity. Regions with a GDP per capita of less 
than 75% of the Community average qualify for this type of funding. The following are 
considered the principal obstacles to development in objective 1 regions: 
o  A low level of general investment 
o  Unemployment rates often higher than average 
o  Lack of services for businesses and communities 
o  Lack of the basic infrastructure necessary for economic activities. 
 
•  Objective 2 is to help regions facing the following difficulties (excluding regions eligible 
for objective 1 support): 
o  Changes in the key sectors and decline of employment in the areas of industrial 
activity and services  
o  A situation of economic and social crisis and the deterioration of neighborhoods 
in urban areas 
o  A decline of traditional activities and depopulation of rural areas 14 
o  A crisis due to the decline of employment in the fisheries sector in areas that 
depend economically on fishing. 
 
•  Objective 3 is to modernize education and increase employment. Any region may qualify, 
provided that it does not receive objective 1 funding.  
 
Most of the remainder of the Structural Funds goes to the Community Initiatives, programs 
initiated by the EC to promote interregional cooperation in solving common problems.  For 
details on these and the small remainder of the Structural Funds, see Ederveen (2003) and EC 
(2004a).  
 
In addition to the Structural Funds, there is a separate ‘Cohesion Fund’, which finances 
environmental and transport projects in the (then) poorer Member States of Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain (henceforth referred to as cohesion countries). The Cohesion Fund goes to 
Member States with a gross national product (GNP) per capita of less than 90% of the 
Community average.  
 
Most of the Structural Funds go to Objective 1 regions. Given that Cohesion funds go to the 
poorer member states, most of the EU regional funds have a redistributive nature. Ederveen 
(2003) shows that this is the case in reality and that on average a 1% increase in GDP per capita 
implies a 3% reduction in EU cohesion (regional) support per capita across the EU-15 countries. 
However, some objective 2 and objective 3 support distribute funds to relatively rich regions, 
and in this sense goes against the overall redistributive nature of regional policy. For detailed 
numbers on distribution of funds by type and member state see EC (2004a, 2004b). 
 
As EC (2004a) and Ederveen (2003) show, the process of deciding on the allocation of regional 
funds involves a complex interaction between the regional authorities, national governments, and 
the EC. First, the EC proposes the budget and the set of rules for cohesion or regional policy for 
the next ‘planning period’ of six years. Following this, the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament review and approve the policy. Once approved, the budget is divided by 
Member States, where the EC, in close consultation with Member States, determines which 15 
regions may use which funds and for which objectives. Each Member State or region then 
prepares regional support plans taking into account the EC’s thematic guidelines. These plans are 
presented to the EC where there is a discussion between the EC and the Member States. Once the 
two parties agree, the EC advances part of the granted funds to the Member States. Only then the 
details of the projects themselves are fleshed out by the regions and the Member States. The 
approach is clearly top down from the EC to the Member State to the region. In many cases, 
especially in regions with weak or non-existent governments, the key decisions are made by the 
EC and the member state. 
 
According to Ederveen (2003), the administration and evaluation of the projects are largely in 
the hands of the regional or national authorities. Earlier the evaluation was rather ad hoc, but 
nowadays, the Member State or region is subject to rather strict guidelines from the EC. The 
responsible regional or national authorities keep the EC informed of progress and provide reports 
to show that the funds are being used in accordance with established guidelines. The EC 
examines the control systems and distributes the remainder of the contribution from the 
Structural Fund. According to EC (2004a), the EC analyzes the development of the monitoring 
indicators and the assessment studies and organizes exchanges on particular themes. It also 
informs the authorities responsible for the programs of any new Community priorities that have 
an impact on regional development. 
 
4 Summary of convergence/divergence and economic performance of regions 
 
In this section, we survey the rich literature on the EU regional catch-up process and analyze the 
evidence to see which of the hypotheses we laid out above is best supported by the evidence. 
First, we look at studies on cross-national European convergence. While admittedly our main 
focus is on regional performance, some elements of the cross-national process of convergence 
are similar to that of regional convergence and would help shed some light on our hypotheses, 
especially the market vs. interventionist policies question. Second, we look at the evidence on 
the cross-regional question. Third, we look at some individual country studies to examine what 
implications they hold for our hypotheses. The one caveat is that we do not assess the different 
methodologies followed in the papers we look at. We assume that the peer review process has 16 
ensured the robustness of the methodologies used. Rather, we focus on the findings in these 
papers on the hypotheses we explore, and derive lessons on which approaches to regional 
development work and which do not. 
 
4.1 What do cross-national studies say? 
 
The clear evidence from cross-national studies shows that that EU has witnessed cross-national 
convergence. Poorer countries have been catching up with the richer ones, and Ireland has even 
surpassed several richer EU countries (see Exhibits  2a  and 2b). However, there is limited 
evidence to show that this catch-up is due to EU structural funds or EU cohesion policy. 
Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) show that the EU-15 countries converged in the period 1995-
2001. They find that structural funds have a positive effect on growth. According to them, “…if 
the change in the rate between the structural funds and the GDP changes by 1 percentage point, 
the GDP growth will increase by a 0.32 percentage point…” They also find that there is no 
evidence that “corrupt” countries gain less growth from Structural Funds and interpret this as 
evidence against moral hazard. 
 
On the other hand, most of the other evidence shows little or no impact of EU regional policy on 
convergence. Barry (2003) looks at the economic performance of the four cohesion countries – 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – relative to the EU and finds they converged to the EU 
average during 1960-1973, diverged 1974-1986 and then resumed convergence from 1987 to 
2000. According to his analysis, most of the factors that affected convergence or divergence 
were market factors such as labor market conditions, FDI inflows, monetary and fiscal policies, 
etc. For example, he says the reasons for convergence during the last period were (1) tighter 
fiscal and monetary policy for euro entry; (2) labor market reforms in Spain; (3) increased FDI 
flows in Ireland; (4) administrative reforms in Greece; and (5) liberalization after EU accession 
in Spain and Portugal. On the issue of EU aid, he says that increased EU aid in the last period has 
contributed to convergence. However, he does not show any specific analysis in support of this 
conclusion but points to other studies that looked at the relationship between EU regional aid and 
convergence. Given this, the preponderance of evidence locates convergence in market opening 
rather that in EU aid. 17 
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Exhibit 2a: Evidence from cross-national studies (I/II)
• NA • Market distortions impede 
convergence
• Convergence, except in Ireland
• Ireland similar in outward orientation, 
protectionism, education to others
• Labour market disequilibrium main 
difference












• NA • Negative impact if markets not 
allowed to decide wage rates
• Big government policies causing 
macroeconomic problems
• General divergence
• Lax fiscal and monetary policies; 
labour market disequilibrium
1973-1986
• NA • Mixed implications as both 
liberalization and better market 
discipline due to EU and euro 
entry, and EU aid identified as 
factors for catch-up
• However, preponderance of 
factors lie towards the market 
end of the spectrum
• Resumption of convergence, 
especially Ireland
• Tighter fiscal and monetary policy for 
euro entry; EU regional aid; labour
market reforms in Spain; increased 
FDI flows in Ireland; administrative 
reforms in Greece; liberalization 
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Exhibit 2b: Evidence from cross-national studies (II/II)
• NA • Evidence in favor of interventionist policy 
at country level. But may mask regional 
differences within countries - as the richer 
regions in poor countries may be 
responsible for most of their growth.
• Corruption finding can be loosely
interpreted as absence of evidence for 
moral hazard
• Convergence across EU-15
• Positive impact of structural funds on 
convergence rates
• Corrupt countries do not gain "less" 
economic growth from structural 
funds 




















• European support as such does not 
improve countries’ growth 
performance
• However, enhances growth in
countries with the right institutions, 
such as openness and institutional 




• NA • Aid works if directed to regions with the 
right institutions, and who are open to 
competition
• Impact of EU 
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Ederveen et al. (2006) look at the impact of EU funds on 13 EU countries (EU-15 minus 
Luxembourg and Germany) and find that European support as such does not improve countries’ 
growth performance. Rather, this support is more effective when it goes to countries with the 
right institutions – openness to competition, quality governance and low corruption.  
 
In this sub-section, we showed that the literature provides evidence of cross-national 
convergence in the EU. However, as we shall show in the next sub-section, this masks lack of 
regional convergence within countries, as most of a country’s growth could be accounted for by 
its richer or “core” regions.  
 
4.2 What do cross-regional studies say? 
 
As Exhibits 3a through 3e show, the evidence on regional convergence is more mixed. Five key 
strands emerge from this evidence that shed light on the hypotheses we are testing. First, there is 
stronger evidence of regional convergence in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and slower or absence 
of convergence after that. This is important as most EU regional policies took effect in the 1980s 
and the 1990s. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991) find evidence of conditional β-convergence rates 
similar to the US of about 2% per year from 1950-1985 in 73 regions across Germany, UK, Italy, 
France, Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark. This is perhaps to be expected, as these were all 
more developed countries in the EU, and perhaps did not have the problems associated with 
underdevelopment as in other less advanced countries such as Ireland and Greece. The authors 
also claim that convergence to steady state independent of government polices, while steady state 
output per worker may differ due to policy differences.  
 
Boldrin and Canova (2001) find some evidence for national convergence (supports findings in 
previous sub-section) but not for regional convergence during 1980-1996. According to Boldrin 
them “Most of the observed inequality in regional income levels can be accounted for by a 
combination of three factors: differences in total factor productivity, differences in employment 
level, and differences in the share of agriculture in regional income… except for a few 'miracles' 
(Ireland, the Italian north-east, the East German Lander, Lisbon's metropolitan area and, Inner 
London) most of Europe seems to have achieved a form of long-run convergence in growth rates. 21 
Controlling for cyclical factors, most regions appear to grow at a pretty common rate, with 
poorer ones growing faster during expansions and slower during recessions. Factors specific to 
individual countries play a major role. Southern Italian regions grew more slowly than the Italian 
average, whereas Spain's poorest regions grew slightly faster than the national average. This is, 
indeed, less than we bargained for. Our analysis of income per capita denies that fast 
convergence in levels is taking place. It suggests that, on average, uniform long-run growth rates 
are to be expected and relative differences will not disappear.” 
 
Cappelen et al. (2003) also find more convergence at the national level than the regional level for 
1980-1997. Cuadrado-Roura (2001) finds evidence for σ convergence from the 1960 to the mid 
1970s, and no convergence thereafter. Similarly, Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996) find 
substantial convergence across 70 regions in six member states from 195-1970, slowing of 
convergence from 1970-1990, with absence of convergence from 1980-1990. Gardiner et al. 
(2004) find slow σ and β convergence in productivity as measured by LFS hours-worked of 
barely 1% per annum during 1980-2001. 
 
The second key strand is that while there has been convergence, it has often been conditional and 
to respective steady states. However, different steady states themselves have continued to persist, 
showing, at the minimum, that EU regional policy has not been effective in helping poorer 
regions leap to higher levels of growth. Canova and Marcet (1995) question Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991) and using a Bayesian model find that their average estimates of convergence rates 
are higher than that found in the literature, about 23 % for the regions, with each unit converging 
to its own steady state. However, they reject the hypothesis that the steady state is the same 
across regions and find that poor regions stay poor and over time the differences are reduced 
only by a small amount. They also claim EU cohesion policy to be without much impact and that 
structural changes in economic environment are needed for catch-up.  
 
Canova (2004) presents evidence for club convergence among EU regions. He finds that there is 
a natural clustering of units in four groups of regional income per capita. Further he finds that 
within groups, poor units converge faster to their steady state than rich ones and that they tend to 
cluster around a pole of attraction that is substantially below the average. He shows that there is  22 
substantial immobility in the ranking of units within groups, in line with findings on persistence 
in inequality in Canova and Marcet (1995). To quote him, “As a consequence of the persistence 
of the initial income characteristics and of the immobility in ranking, the steady-state distribution 
of income per capita will become polarized. Since poor units are also those featuring low initial 
average human capital, distributions of income and education are more polarized and are 
geographically located … in the periphery…, the results provide a bleak picture over the 
possibility of equalizing income per capita both in EU… countries in the near future.”  
 
Carrington (2006) finds evidence of convergence that is neither fast nor continuous, and that 
regions are persistent in belonging to certain income groups, while sub-periods of convergence 
and divergence are discernible during 1984-1993. Dall'erba and Le Gallo (2007) find two tiers of 
convergence, one in core richer regions and one in peripheral poorer regions, with the peripheral 
regions converging faster during 1989-1999. 
 
At the absolute level, Cuadrado-Roura et al. (2000) find β-convergence of 2.8-3.5% during the 
1981-1990 in a study of 97 European regions. However, when they look at conditional 
convergence, they observe three regional groups for conditional β convergence. The first group 
has regions exhibiting positive and significant fixed effects growing faster than others. This 
group includes such as Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg and Ile-de-France. The second group exhibits 
negative and significant fixed effects and includes regions such as UK regions (except Southeast 
ones), 11 Spanish regions, Portugal and Greece. The third group has near zero fixed effects and 
significant slowing or accelerating factors cannot be detected for this group.  
 
Cuadrado-Roura et al. (2000) also do not find much evidence in support of the core-periphery 
model. However, when they disaggregate and analyze gross value added, productivity growth 
and employment creation, they see five emerging patterns. First, they find advanced regions with 
above average performance such as Hesse, Luxembourg and Lasso. Second, they identify 
dynamic intermediate regions such as Lombardy, Baden-Wurttemberg and Navarra, with 
intermediate levels of development, but dynamic in terms of productivity and employment. The 
third group is intermediate regions with less dynamism including regions such as Basque 
country, Liguria and Basse-Normandie which do not seem to be catching up. The fourth group 23 
includes regions in decline such as the old industrial regions in France and UK. Finally, there is a 
group of heterogeneous clusters which do not fall into a pattern. These include Dutch and 
Portuguese (excluding Lisbon and the North) regions. This shows that regions better able to 
adapt to changing global technological and market environments do better. However, it is left 
unclear if better performance is due to market friendly or interventionist policies. 
 
The third strand has been very limited evidence showing that EU regional policy supports 
regional catch-up by poorer regions. Leonardi (2005) finds that Objective 1 regions have 
converged to EU mean, while non-Objective 1 regions have remained stable, suggesting that EU 
funds are effective in helping poorer regions catch up. Cappelen et. al. (2003) find EU support 
has significant and positive impact on growth performance of EU regions, however, with 
economic effects stronger in more developed regions. Most of the other evidence shows that EU 
funds have little or no impact (Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Canova and Marcet, 1995; Canova, 
2004; Dall'erba and Le Gallo, 2007; Fagerberg nd Verspagen, 1996; Le Gallo and Dall'erba, 
2006). According to Boldrin and Canova (2001), their analysis “does not show any indirect 
evidence that Structural and Cohesion Funds regions are behaving any differently from the 
remaining ones. In fact, time series data extending back to the pre-regional policies period 
suggest that much more convergence was taking place then than now.” 
 
The fourth strand that comes from the literature is that the national environment matters. 
Cuadrado-Roura (2001) finds strong national influence on the performance of regions, and that 
regions tend to cluster together both in terms of initial development level and per capita GDP 
growth rates. Quah (1996) also finds that national factors affect regional distribution dynamics. 
While Cuadrado-Roura et al. (2000) find that a fixed national effects model is not significant in 
comparison with the general model, the results of their fixed effects do suggest a common 
behavioral pattern amongst regions in the same country. Assuming policy and market 
environment is more similar within nations, this suggests that national  policy and  market 
environment matters more than EU regional policy. It also suggests that top-down development 
approaches from the supra-national level may have limited impact.  
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The fifth strand is that geography matters. Badinger et al. (2004) find high spatial correlation 
with neighboring regions suggesting predominance of market forces over centralized 
redistributionist policy. Quah (1996) finds physical location and geographical spillovers matter 
more than national macro factors in explaining distribution dynamics. This suggests that cross-
border market links matter, and that decentralized regions with freedom to create market links 









Exhibit 3a: Evidence from cross-regional studies (I/V)
•NA • High spatial correlation 
shows predominance 
of market forces over 
centralized 
redistributionist policy
• Accounting for spatial effects in a dynamic 
panel data model, they find convergence at 
a rate of 7% 




• 194 NUTS 2 regions Badinger et. 
al. (2004)
• NA • Absence of evidence of 
increasing returns and 
agglomeration in 
combination with 
evidence of little effect 





• Neither β convergence nor β divergence for 
income or labor productivity
• National σ convergence but no regional σ
convergence for income
• Absence of empirical support for increasing 
returns and agglomeration theories
• EU regional and structural policies have little 
relationship with fostering regional growth
• No evidence of relationship between 











• Convergence study 
of 73 regions across 




• Conditional β-convergence rates similar to 
the US of about 2% per year
• Conditional convergence rates similar 
across countries and regions
Key findings
• NA
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Exhibit 3b: Evidence from cross-regional studies (II/V)
• Centralized policies not 
seen to work
• Failure of cohesion 
policy may support 
market hypothesis
• However, unclear if 
structural change 
accomplished best 
through state or market
• Fast convergence to respective steady states
• However, differences between steady states 
persist, poor regions remain poor
• Authors claim EU cohesion policy without much 
impact and structural changes in economic 













• Mixed, central support 
with positive impact, 
however, convergence 
more at national level 
with strong autonomous, 
accountable 
governments
• Mixed • More convergence at national than at the regional 
level
• EU support with significant and positive impact on 
growth performance of EU regions, with economic 
effects stronger in more developed regions
1980-
1997




• Similar to Canova and 
Marcet (1995)
• Same to Canova and 
Marcet (1995)
• Natural clustering of units in four groups of regional 
income per capita
• Persistence of initial income characteristics and 
substantial immobility in ranking (clustering rather 
than convergence, even within groups)











• NA • NA • Finds evidence of convergence that is neither fast 
nor continuous, regions are persistent in belonging 
to certain income groups, while sub periods of 
convergence and divergence are discernible
1984-
1993
• Sample of 
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vs. intervention 
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Exhibit 3c: Evidence from cross-regional studies (III/V)
• Shows institutional 
environment is important
• However, does not show 
which environment is 
better for growth
• Shows that 
government policies 
are important
• However, does not 
show which policies




• No convergence in income Mid 1970s-
1988
• Again no significant convergence 1983-1996
• Strong national influence on the performance of 
regions, regions tend to cluster together both in 
terms of initial development level and per capita 
GDP growth rates
1977-1994
• Potentially decentralized 
regions may have more 
autonomy and flexibility 
to adjust faster to 
changing global 
environments
• Regions better able 





• However, unclear if 
better performance 




• Absolute β-convergence of 2.8-3.5%, 1981-90
• Three regional groups for conditional β convergence 
- +ve, significant fixed effects growing faster
- -ve, significant fixed effects growing slower
- Zero fixed effects
• Five situations from disaggregated analysis of gross 
value added, productivity & employment
- Advanced regions, e.g., Hesse
- Dynamic intermediate regions, e.g., Lombardy
- Intermediate regions with less dynamism, e.g., 
Basque country
- Regions in decline, e.g., old UK industrial 
regions 
- Miscellaneous heterogeneous cluster
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Exhibit 3d: Evidence from cross-regional studies (IV/V)
• NA • EU investment began in 
earnest in 1990, potentially 
showing that it actually 
exacerbates differences
• Substantial convergence
• Poorest region grew 2.8%-4.3% faster than richest








• Slowing of convergence
• Poorest region grew 0.8-2.4% faster than richest
1970-1990
• Absence of convergence
• No evidence of convergence
• Three convergence clubs based on employment - high 
unemployment, intermediate unemployment and low 
unemployment
• EU support positive in low employment regions, 
ineffective in the other two clubs
1980-1990
• NA • Little or no impact of structural 
funds on convergence rates
• Two tiers of convergence, one in core richer regions 
and one in peripheral poorer regions. Peripheral 
regions converge faster.
• Non-significant impact of EU funds on the regions’
steady states
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Exhibit 3e: Evidence from cross-regional studies (V/V)
• Suggests that top-
down redistribution 




have freedom to 
create market links 
with other regions 
irrespective of 
national boundaries
• Assuming policy more 
similar within nations, 
this suggests that 
markets matter more 
than policy
• Geographical proximity 
explanation also 
evidence of impact of 
market links
• Both national factors and physical location 
(surrounding regions) affect regional distribution 
dynamics
• However, physical location & geographical spillovers 




• Examines how 







• Suggests central 
intervention 
effective
• Suggests EU funds 
effective
• Objective 1 regions have converged to EU mean, while 
non-Objective 1 regions have remained stable
1988-
99





• NA • Little or no impact of 
structural funds on 
convergence rates.
• Rejection of assumption of temporal independence in 
β Convergence between 1980-89 and 1989-1999; 
1989 being the year of reform of structural funds 
• Two tiers of convergence, one in core richer regions 








• NA • NA • Slow σ and β convergence in productivity as measured 
by LFS hours-worked
• Slow convergence of barely 1% per annum
1980-
2001
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4.3 What do individual country / region studies say? 
 
Individual country-level studies also provide a mixed picture on the impact of EU regional policy 
on regional economic performance. De La Fuente (2003) finds that EU investment in 
infrastructure post accession makes it more distributive, with a positive effect on convergence. 
He sees the EU Community Support Framework as a large positive shock that, over a period of 7 
years, raised aggregate infrastructure, other capital stock and years of training. For objective 1 
regions as a whole, the CSF added 6.9 percentage points to output and 3.4 points to employment 
in 2000. 
 
Pereira (1997) shows that EU programs had a substantial impact on economic growth. During 
1989-93, “Greece, Ireland and Portugal received grants corresponding to 2.3, 2.9 and 3.5% of 
their respective GDPs for the period. The private cofinancing requirements were 0.6, 1.4 and 
2.1%, while the public co-financing requirements were 2.4, 1.6 and 3.4%, respectively. 
Accordingly, the total resources involved in these programs are estimated to be 5.8, 5.3 and 9% 
of their respective GDPs for the period.” According to the paper’s simulation results, these 
transfers induced an improvement in GDP growth of 0.3 percentage points for the Greek and 
Irish economies, and 0.5 percentage points for the Portuguese economy. However, their analysis 
is at a national level, and does not say much about what happened to regional economic 
performance within these countries. 
 
According  to Barry (2001) both the single market and EU funds played a role in Ireland’s 
economic performance. In addition, national economic policies, such as a lower tax rate also 
played an important role. On balance, it seems that national policies and the single market played 
a much more important role in Ireland’s impressive growth than EU policies.  Farrel (2004) also 
finds that institutional and market forces had greater effect than EU redistribution in explaining 
the differential growth between Spain and Ireland. While Spain as a whole caught up, internal 
regional disparity actually increased. Further, Spain’s investment was primarily in infrastructure, 
while Ireland also focused on developing human capital. Both the latter points show the 
importance of strong regional governments. First, Ireland is small enough to be a region, and its 
government responsible for its national growth delivered. Similarly the Spanish government also 31 
pursued policies for national growth, however, given its size, it was at the expense of some 
regions and the benefit of others. The second and related point is that the Spanish regional 
governments did not have the same power to promote their development as the Irish government 
did. So, even if they wanted, they could not have set their priorities independent of national 
influence, which could partly explain the differences in EU spending in Ireland vs. Spain. 
 
Garcia-Mila and McGuire (2001) evaluated impact of central government and EU grants on 17 
regions of Spain by evaluating economic performance before and after implementation of grant 
programs. They find that the grants are generally redistributive and targeted to stimulate 
economic activity in the poorer regions. However, they have not been effective at stimulating 
private investment or improving overall economies of the poorer regions, and the difference in 
GDP growth rates between recipient and non-recipient regions between the two time periods is 
not statistically significant. Further, the non-recipient group experienced a larger increase in 
private investment per capita between the two time periods, showing that other factors matter 




Exhibit 4a: Evidence from individual country studies (I/II)
• Ireland as an autonomous 
country had several policy 
instruments at its disposal that 
regions do not have, e.g., they 
cannot lower corporate taxes 
like Ireland did.




• Both singe market and structural funds have had 
modest impacts
• National economic policies such as the lower tax rate 
also played an important role
• Explaining 






• Particular types of intervention 
can work – for example, 
policies to attract MNCs, 
however, these instruments 










• Much higher Irish growth was in part supported by EU 
structural funds
• In Spain, while the whole country converged to EU 
average, internal regional inequality actually increased, 
with some regions like Madrid and Navarre getting to 
income levels above EU average
• Part of differences in the two cases explained by (1) 
institutional differences; and (2) policy differences; 
Spain’s investment was in infrastructure, while Ireland 
also focused on developing human capital and on 
industrial policy to attract large MNCs to set up 
operations in Ireland
• Comparative 
study of impact 
of structural 




• Again shows, autonomous 
and accountable national 
governments better able to 
deliver







• Using simulation results, they show that EU programs 
had a substantial impact on economic growth and 
contributed to their convergence to EU standards – 0.3 
percentage points increase in growth for Greece and 
Ireland, and 0.5 percentage points for Portugal
1989-
93
• Examines impact 
of EU structural 
funds on the 
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Exhibit 4b: Evidence from individual country studies (II/II)
• NA • EU support 
found to be 
positive
• EU investment in infrastructure post accession 
makes it more distributive, with a positive effect 
on convergence
• EU Community Support Framework seen as a 
large positive shock, that over a period of 7 
years raises aggregate infrastructure, other 
capital stock and years of training
• For objective 1 regions as a whole, the CSF 
adds 6.9 percentage points to output and 3.4 
points to employment in 2000





• NA • EU support 
seen to be 
ineffective, 
other factors 





• Grants are generally redistributive and targeted 
to stimulate economic activity in the poorer 
regions
• However, they have not been effective at 
stimulating private investment or improving 
overall economies of the poorer regions
• Difference in GDP growth rates between 
recipient and non-recipient regions between the 
two time periods not statistically significant
• Non-recipient group experiences larger 
increase in private investment per capita 






• Evaluated impact of 
central government 
and EU grants on 17 
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5 Lessons from the EU experience - What does the evidence tell us? 
 
As Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) point out, two key factors point to doubts that EU policies 
lead to convergence. First is the fact that of the 44 regions eligible for Objective 1 funds in 1989, 
43 still remained eligible 14 years after the 1989 reforms. Only Abruzzo in Italy managed to 
come out of the initial group in 1997. And the second is the lack of regional convergence since 
the implementation of the Structural Funds, as most of the studies looking at regional 
convergence show. Although EU regional policy was not successful in helping poorer regions 
catch-up to the richer ones, there are, nevertheless, important inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence as to what approach would work best in promoting regional development. We shall 
argue in this section, that the preponderance of the evidence presented so far in  this paper 
support the regional enabler hypothesis  discussed in section 2. We show that this evidence 
provides support for a bottom-up market-oriented regional development policy, albeit with some 
important exceptions.  
 
Five key inferences can be drawn based on the studies discussed above that support one or both 
parts of the regional enabler hypothesis –  market-orientation and decentralized bottom-up 
approach. They are as follows: 
 
1.  Presence of national convergence and absence of regional convergence  supports the 
regional enabler approach. 
 
As several studies show, the EU has witnessed national convergence but not regional 
convergence. What does this mean for our hypotheses on regional development? Let us first take 
the market vs. interventionist policy question. There were two European processes in work here. 
One was the single market, and the other was the regional development policy. And where would 
the single market have the biggest impact – the nation or the region? Arguably, the single market 
erased international borders, while it probably did less to impact intra-national differences in 
factors that affect development such as policy, infrastructure, human capital, technology, and 
entrepreneurship.  Therefore, it is only to be expected that we would observe national 
convergence, but not regional convergence. And that is in fact what the literature finds. On the 35 
other hand, the EU structural funds were aimed directly at reducing regional disparities, and in 
that respect, it was not successful. Therefore, this combination of evidence suggests that 
removing market barriers is a bigger spur to catch-up than redistributive aid. 
 
What does this mean for the centralized vs. decentralized question? National governments are 
strong, relatively autonomous, accountable to their constituents, and are responsible for most 
policies that affect development. On the other hand, most regional jurisdictions in the EU have 
weaker, less autonomous governments often accountable upwards to the national government 
rather than downwards to their constituents. Further, their developmental responsibilities are also 
limited. Given this, it is not surprising that the national governments were better able to take 
advantage of the single market than regional ones. On the other hand, the regional governments 
might even have felt a lower imperative for needed reform, or pressure to put aside their 
priorities in favor of supra-national or national priorities. This could then partly explain why the 
poorer regions did not catch up. 
 
In short, the fact that nations converged while regions did not suggests that a regional enabler 
approach is best suited for regional development.  
 
2.  Convergence from 1960s to 1980s, and absence of convergence thereafter,  supports the 
market hypothesis over the supra-national interventionist one. 
 
The evidence discussed in the previous section shows that regional convergence was observed 
during the 1960s, 1970s and partly in the 1980s. And this convergence slows or stops in the late 
1980s and 1990s. For example, Cuadrado-Roura (2001) shows that the EU has exhibited 
differences in convergence of regions over different points of time. He shows the presence of 
convergence from 1960 to the mid-1970s, but no significant convergence thereafter. The latter 
period is the time when the EU cohesion policy and structural funds assumed a significant role in 
regional development, especially after the 1989 reforms. What does this tell us? As in the 
previous point, it shows that the single market may be more important than EU regional aid. The 
earlier convergence may be due to the effects of removal of national market barriers, which 
played out till the 1980s, after which this effect ceased to have a big impact. And EU 36 
redistribution did not do much to begin convergence again. What this again suggests is that 
perhaps we now need to focus on national and regional market distortions, rather than try to 
solve the problem by throwing money at it. 
 
3.  Evidence from specific cases supports the regional enabler approach. 
 
The biggest EU success story has been Ireland
2
4.  The finding that geographic proximity matters supports the regional enabler approach. 
. While Spain has also converged to the EU 
average, the regions within Spain have not converged. As the literature reviewed in the previous 
section showed, Ireland’s growth has been supported by several market liberalizing reforms such 
as tighter fiscal and monetary policy and lower taxes. This in combination with the fact that it is 
the gateway to a large EU single market contributed to bring in large amounts of FDI that 
boosted its growth. As Barry (2003) points out, even Greece and Spain as a whole converged 
after following a tight fiscal and monetary policy for EU entry, labor market reforms (Spain) and 
liberalization after accession (Spain and Portugal). This again supports the market hypothesis 
over the interventionist hypothesis. 
 
The other key point here is that this approach will not work for regional development in the 
absence of a strong and relatively autonomous regional government. Most of the liberalization 
reforms in Spain, Ireland and Greece were brought about by national governments. Regional 
governments do not have the same remit, and even if they had the desire to pursue a more liberal 
policy, they are often hobbled by the protectionist tendency of the national government. 
Therefore, regional development can be constrained to the extent regional government autonomy 
in pursuing appropriate policies is curtailed. 
 
 
As we have discussed  before,  Quah (1996) finds that physical location and  geographical 
spillovers matter more than national macro factors in explaining regional distribution dynamics. 
Assuming that policy is more similar within nations than across, this suggests that the market 
                                                 
2 While recent events, especially the slowdown in Ireland may seem to contradict this, we feel that this is due to 
global recession, and when the global economy recovers, Ireland will most likely recover with it. 37 
environment matters more than the policy environment. It also suggests that geographical factors 
are more important than national policy factors, which means that centralized redistribution may 
only have limited impact. Further, it also suggests that more autonomous regions able to forge 
market links with other regions without being burdened by national constraints and barriers may 
significantly bolster regional development. 
 
5.  Ability to choose what to spend the money on supports the decentralized bottom-up 
hypothesis. 
 
Another factor could be that centralized funds could be spent on the wrong priorities. As 
Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) point out, about half of Objective 1 funds have been 
committed to the development of transport, infrastructure and the environment. Business and 
tourism support take up a bit less than a quarter. As their analysis shows, that support in these 
two areas have had a negligible impact on regional convergence both across the EU and if only 
Objective 1 regions are considered. Support for agriculture and rural restructuring has a positive 
impact in the very short-term, and the influence wanes over time. The only medium-term 
positive impact they find, is in the funds targeted at education and the development of human 
capital. Similarly, Farrel (2004) also finds that part of the reason for Ireland’s superior growth 
over Spain was that EU investment in Spain was in infrastructure, while Ireland also focused on 
developing human capital.  One could then infer that it is best to invest  in education at the 
expense of other areas. However, another inference is also possible. And that is that centralized 
redistribution focuses on the wrong priorities, both because they lack appropriate local 




In sum, the evidence on the EU regional policies and regional development suggests the 
following lessons: 
•  Remove barriers to trade and movement of people, skills and technologies. Let the 
market work. 38 
•  Minimize centralized redistribution and subsidies. Transfers to poorer regions can distort 
market signals and hamper the flow of business to lower wage areas or of people to 
higher income regions. 
•  Where there is central investment, make sure it is in the appropriate areas. For example, 
investment in human capital can increase the incentives for companies to set up 
businesses in the poorer region. Similarly, certain types of physical infrastructure may 
also do that. However, investing in physical infrastructure without investing in human 
capital will only exacerbate the problem – goods will flow from richer to poorer areas 
and skilled people the other way. 
•  Make sure the regional government takes the lead on regional development and has both 
the power and the accountability (to its constituents) to do so. It should be responsible 
and accountable for the resources it raises and what it spends them on. This does not 
preclude central transfers, but it does mean that the region must also contribute to any 
potential projects to ensure that it chooses projects wisely. And the accountability must 
be downwards to the citizens, not upwards to the national government or the EU. 
•  The role of the national and supra-national governments should be limited to provide a 
level playing field. 
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